exclusive right. 5 At the heart of Professor Mark Lemley's new Essay are questions regarding whether the novelty requirement can be used to enforce the limited term requirement, and whether it should. 6 Professor Lemley answers yes to both, and I am pleased to have an opportunity to respond. I agree with him on the first question, but with the important qualification that the rule he supports is in tension with Supreme Court precedent. On the second question, although I agree that the novelty requirement should have some role to play in policing the patent term, I believe that Professor Lemley's logic supports an anti-extension rule that is overly expansive.
Professor Lemley's article addresses the effect of a recent amendment to the Patent Act's novelty requirement by the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA) 7 on a rule that stems from a case called Metallizing Engineering Co. v. Kenyon Bearing & Auto Parts Co. 8 The Metallizing rule bars an inventor's right to a patent when that inventor practiced the invention in secret, but exploited it commercially for more than one year before filing a patent application. 9 Although nothing is withdrawn from the public domain when inventions are patented under these circumstances, the rule protects the public in the sense that it prevents the inventor from effectively extending the patent term by delaying filing. 10 Professor Lemley argues that the AIA left the Metallizing rule intact. He contends that the AIA's "otherwise available to the public" language does not override Metallizing's gloss on the term "public use," 11 which sweeps the inventor's own secret commercial uses into the ambit of that term. He also argues that the rule is correct for policy reasons.
Professor Lemley's statutory interpretation argument has much to recommend it, and I largely agree with that argument. But I also conclude that Metallizing contravenes Supreme Court decisions that interpret "public use." Thus, although the language of the AIA may not provide grounds for abrogating the rule, I believe that the Supreme Court should reject it based on its own precedent if it decides to take up this issue. I also believe that 10. Metallizing, 153 F.2d at 520 (stating that by "making use of his secret to gain a competitive advantage over others," the inventor would "thereby extend the period of his monopoly").
11. See infra Appendix.
overruling Metallizing is the correct result as a matter of policy. Although Metallizing prohibits the undesirable "extension of the patent monopoly" in the sense articulated by its author, Judge Learned Hand, it also creates significant costs. I take up the doctrinal and policy issues in turn.
II. The Supreme Court's Precedent I agree with Professor Lemley that the AIA's catchall phase "otherwise available to the public" cannot bear the heavy weight of overruling the longstanding precedent that defined the terms "public use" and "on sale" to cover some types of secret activities.
12 If secret sales, in particular, no longer qualify as prior art, that would be a drastic change in well-established law. Further support for Professor Lemley's conclusion stems from the observation that, as in the pre-AIA version of the novelty provision, the adjective "public" modifies the word "use," but not the words "on sale." If the phrase "otherwise available to the public" infuses the rest of the prior art listed in § 102(a)(1) with a "public" character, then the adjective "public" before "use" would be unnecessary. 13 Under this interpretation, the phrase "otherwise available to the public" perpetuates Metallizing's legal fiction that a competitive exploitation of a secret invention makes the invention "available to the public" with respect to that inventor's later patent filings. 14 More generally, I agree with Professor Lemley that courts should not use the AIA as a vehicle to overturn established novelty-related doctrines such as inherency and the experimental use exception.
15
Another important question, however, is whether Metallizing correctly followed the Supreme Court's precedent on public use. Here, I part company with Professor Lemley. Judge Hand's intimation that the Metallizing rule follows from "the fiat of Congress that it is part of the consideration for a patent that the public shall as soon as possible begin to enjoy the 12. Lemley, supra note 6, at 1127. I also agree with Professor Lemley that post-enactment comments of two senators do not provide sufficient support for the conclusion that the AIA was intended to override this well-established interpretation. The Supreme Court's focus on public accessibility, even if minimal, as the touchstone of public use is in serious tension with Metallizing's conclusion that absolutely secret activities can also qualify as "public."
To justify the rule, Judge Hand relied heavily on Pennock v. Dialogue, 26 a well-known 1829 Supreme Court decision interpreting the then-existing novelty provision that barred patents on inventions that were "known or used before the application." 27 Sensibly, Justice Story in Pennock concluded that this phrase meant "known or used by the public [,] before the application" for a patent. 28 The Court additionally explained that "it would materially retard the progress of science and the useful arts, and give a premium to those who should be least prompt to communicate their discoveries" if an inventor were permitted to hold back from the knowledge of the public the secrets of his invention; if he should for a long period of years retain the monopoly, and make, and sell his invention publicly, and . . . 17. In addition to stretching dictionary meanings of "public" and "secret" to a breaking point, Judge Hand inferred a bar that is effective only against the inventor, but not against any third party, in the face of statutory language that does not even hint at such a distinction. See Karshtedt, supra note 9, at 263-64.
18 Although the reference to holding back secrets superficially supports Metallizing, the rest of the Supreme Court's opinion suggests that the patent in suit was invalidated because the public was aware of the workings of the patented invention-a water hose whose sections were held together using rivets. 30 For example, the Court reasoned that "[i]f the public were already in possession and common use of an invention . . . there might be sound reason for presuming, that the legislature did not intend to grant an exclusive right to any one to monopolize that which was already common." 31 Thus, Pennock appears to focus on denying protection to inventions that are already in the public domain, not on preventing effective patent term extension.
Congress codified the holding of Pennock in 1836, 32 revising the novelty section to say that a person may patent an invention "not known or used by others before his or their discovery or invention thereof, and not, at the time of his application for a patent, in public use or on sale . . . ."
33 Thus, while Congress made clear that the patent right can be lost when an invention is sold or relinquished to the public, it did not adopt Pennock's languagewhich was arguably dicta-to render patent-defeating secret commercial uses through which inventors attempted to effectively extend the length of the patent term.
To be sure, cases following Pennock have recognized that certain actions by the inventor can result in what might be termed "equitable forfeiture" of the patent-a loss of a right in the nature of unclean hands or laches. Because these decisions were based on equity, however, they entailed factspecific inquiries into the patentee's behavior and did not apply the forfeiture as a strict bar that attached a specific number of years after the occurrence of 29 . Id. at 19. 30. Id. at 8. 31. Id. at 23; see id. at 8 ("[The rivet hose] had been known and used as common public property, (and not as private property) which any one might use as publicly known."); see also id. at 4 ("As long as an inventor keeps to himself the subject of his discovery, the public cannot be injured . . . . But if the public, with the knowledge and the tacit consent of the inventor, is permitted to use the invention without opposition, it is a fraud upon the public afterwards to take out a patent.") (jury charge). The circuit court's opinion, which the Supreme Court thought to be "perfectly correct," id. at 24, supports the conclusion that the invention at issue had entered the public domain. approach "overwhelms the PTO with patent applications, leads to too many patents of dubious quality, and creates a situation where many patented inventions are underdeveloped." 42 We live in an era when the public is concerned about "non-practicing entities" (NPEs), a term used to describe companies that enforce patents but do not practice the patented inventions themselves, and early patenting likely contributes to this phenomenon. Second, there is a great deal of skepticism as to whether the patent document actually achieves the purpose of communicating information that is useful to the relevant audiences, 43 and patent applications that are rushed and premature due to the pressure of the one-year bar are, it would appear, particularly likely to include uninformative disclosures. Third, maintaining Metallizing can, ironically, disserve the pro-disclosure policy. Under the current rule, an inventor cannot obtain a patent when a year from the date of the first commercial exploitation of the invention has passed, and therefore has no inducement to disclose his or her invention through patenting. As a result, unless discovered by others, the invention might forever remain a trade secret 44 -and might even be abandoned completely.
45
More importantly, a strong argument can be made that "the obligation to disclose is not the principal reason for a patent system . . . . The reason for the patent system is to encourage innovation and its fruits: new jobs and new industries, new consumer goods and trade benefits." 46 As Alan Devlin has explained, patents can, at least in theory, serve their purpose of incentivizing innovation without providing any enabling disclosures. 47 A rule that forces early disclosure at the cost of punishing commercializing inventorsincluding those who might lack resources to file for a patent in the first few years of the invention's exploitation-might instead chill innovation. 48 Given the public's concern with NPEs and the widespread sentiment that the 42. Karshtedt, supra note 9, at 313 (footnotes omitted) ( drafted specifications may defeat the disclosure objective. In any event the extent to which the scientific and engineering communities rely on these documents for instruction is speculative at best."); Lemley, supra note 6, at 1131 ("One might reasonably question how valuable the disclosure function of patent law is in the modern world . . . .").
44. Karshtedt, supra note 9, at 311. 45. Cf. Paulik v. Rizkalla, 760 F.2d 1270, 1276 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (en banc) (criticizing and reversing a rule that would "discourage inventors and their supporters from working on projects that had been 'too long' set aside, because of the impossibility of relying, in a priority contest, on either their original work or their renewed work"). 48. See Karshtedt, supra note 9, at 317-18; id. at 306-08 (explaining why a grace period beyond one year may be needed to optimally promote innovation).
PTO allows too many underdeveloped patents, it seems particularly odd for the patent system to penalize inventors who explore their inventions' commercial potential in good faith before filing a patent application.
I sympathize with Professor Lemley's concern about "submarine" patents-patents whose delayed issuance is designed to take an existing industry by surprise. 49 But I think this problem can be solved without the Metallizing rule for two reasons. First, this rule is far from the only driver for early patenting. Many legal and business considerations may push an inventor into patent rather than trade secret protection. 50 For example, an inventor who delays patenting risks that another will invent and publicly disclose the same subject matter-or, worse yet, patent it himself or herself.
51
That would eviscerate both patent and trade secret rights of the first inventor and, if the second inventor obtains a patent, may expose the first inventor to patent infringement liability. 52 As a result, the Metallizing rule may not be necessary to deter submarine patenting behavior. Second, equitable doctrines remain available for use against patentees who strategically delay patent filing in order to ambush potential infringers. Courts have dealt with the earlier incarnation of the submarine patent problem by applying the doctrine of prosecution laches, 53 and I believe that this doctrine should readily apply to the abusive behaviors envisioned by Professor Lemley. 52. If, however, the first inventor shows by clear and convincing evidence that he or she engaged in commercial use of this invention at least a year prior to the second inventor's filing, then there is no liability. See 35 U.S.C. § 273(a)-(b) (2012); Lemley, supra note 6, at 1131 n. 73 . 1985) ).
trigger the on-sale bar.
57 I do not reject wholesale this rationale for the novelty requirement-and, indeed, agree with Professor Lemley that secret sales should continue to count as patent-barring "disclosures" within the meaning of § 102. Nevertheless, I believe that the rationale of prohibiting effective extension of the length of the patent term, when the policy consideration of protecting the public domain is not also implicated, would lead to an untenable rule. For this reason, I believe that the on-sale bar should extend only to sales of embodiments of the actual invention, and should not include commercial exploitation of a firm's secret internal activities.
There is a significant difference between a secret sale (or an offer for sale) of an invention's embodiment and "competitive exploitation" 58 of an invention kept within a firm. The rule that secret sales are patent-barring both prevents an effective extension of the patent term and, arguably, also protects the public domain. A sale, even if made in secret and accompanied by nondisclosure obligations, places the invention into the stream of commerce, potentially removing it from the inventor's control and creating the possibility of public possession. 59 Even in the unusual case where the nature of the invention is not communicated to the buyer at the time the sale occurs, the buyer (or a third party, if the buyer sublicenses the invention or incorporates it into a downstream product) can in theory reverse engineer the invention from the product sold. Although this sort of leakage is certainly possible without the sale of an invention-for example, when employees who know the details of a secret process leave the company-it should be significantly more likely when the invention itself is sold to a third party.
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In a similar context, one court found it "fair to presume that [the invention's] secret will be uncovered by potential competitors long before the time when a patent would have expired if the inventor had made a timely application 58. Metallizing, 153 F.2d at 520. 59. Cf. Lorenz v. Colgate-Palmolive-Peet Co., 167 F.2d 423, 426 (3d Cir. 1948) (asking whether "public use by one who employs a process in breach of a fiduciary relationship, who tortiously appropriates it or who pirates it, should bar the inventor from the fruits of his monopoly" and answering this question in the affirmative).
60. Professor Robert Merges has introduced the term "secret disclosure" to capture this concept:
[A] confidential sale or non-informing public use can be a 'disclosure' in that it represents a move away from complete secrecy, or use only inside a highly protected sphere such as within the strict boundaries of a single company. There is room, in other words, for the idea of a 'secret disclosure'-a disclosure that goes beyond absolute nondisclosure but not nearly all the way to wide-open and free dissemination. and disclosure to the Patent Office."
61 If the invention nevertheless ends up being patented later, the unfairness to the public-or, at the very least, to the buyer or offeree 62 -becomes apparent. 63 In contrast, the Metallizing rule functions only to police the patent term.
Furthermore, I have serious doubts about the Metallizing rule's coherency and administrability. The requirements to prove the "ready for patenting" and "offer for sale" prongs of the on-sale bar are difficult enough to apply, 64 and Metallizing introduces an additional, serious complication: how attenuated does an invention have to be from a competitive exploitation for a patent applicant to avoid the bar? The paradigmatic Metallizing scenario is the sale of a product made with a secret process, but does the bar stop there? It is instructive, for example, that no sales were involved at all in Metallizing itself-the inventor repaired car parts using a process he invented, but no title transfer occurred. 65 Competitive exploitation is a vague standard of potentially sweeping scope, and the courts have struggled mightily with it.
For example, in Invitrogen Corp. v. Biocrest Manufacturing, L.P., 66 the Federal Circuit rejected the argument that a company's internal use of a secret process "to further other projects" within the company's "general business of widespread research" creates a bar under Metallizing.
67
The court distinguished Metallizing because there was no evidence that the company "received compensation for internally, and secretly, exploiting" the process. 68 The result is unsatisfying because the court never explained why the absence of direct compensation for the invention, which the inventor appears to have exploited to obtain a competitive advantage, decisively took the patent out of the scope of Metallizing.
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Indeed, if the "extension of the patent term" rationale is taken at face value, it becomes difficult to explain the result in Invitrogen and the (alleged) product-of-a-secret-invention limit of the Metallizing rule. Because there is nothing talismanic about direct compensation, 70 Professor Lemley's policy arguments for maintaining the Metallizing bar apply equally to sales of a product made by a secret process and to the activities in Invitrogen. More generally, trade secrets by definition enable their owners to derive "independent economic value" from their use, 71 implying competitive exploitation. Thus, under Professor Lemley's rationale, an inventor should not be allowed to obtain a patent on any subject matter that he or she has used as a trade secret for more than a year prior to patent filing. This rule, which one might call a super-Metallizing rule, is much more coherent than the alternative. 72 I think, however, that the super-Metallizing rule is untenable because it might introduce an unbearable degree of uncertainty over the validity of U.S. patents. 73 In the course of inventing, a firm generates a vast number of interrelated trade secrets that could render a large proportion of that firm's later-filed patent claims anticipated or obvious. 74 The super-Metallizing rule would also generate expensive discovery disputes, 75 which is one of the problems that the AIA was intended to eliminate by replacing the first to invent system with first to file. 76 Finally, although the problem can be mitigated by sealing parts of the record, 77 the super-Metallizing rule might be prone to abuse by litigants who might wish to obtain their adversaries' trade secrets. 78 To be sure, my proposal for using equity to render certain patents unenforceable due to strategic or abusive behavior by inventors also allows for inquiries regarding a firm's trade secrets, but allegations of fraudulent behavior, such as inequitable conduct, must be pled with particularity. 79 Equitable defenses would therefore be asserted more rarely than the defenses sounding in the "strict-liability" one-year bar.
V. The Policy of International Harmonization
My last point concerns harmonization and the role of trade secrets in promoting innovation. One of the driving forces behind the AIA was to harmonize the U.S. patent system with that of the rest of the world. 80 Accordingly, first to invent was replaced by first to file, a prior commercial user right was added to achieve further consistency with other countries' patent laws, 81 and another rule that was (with one exception) unique to the United States-the best mode requirement-was effectively eliminated from the Patent Act. 82 The Metallizing rule has also been unique to the United States, 83 and, given the goal of harmonization, retaining it seems inconsistent with the intent of Congress. Like the rest of the world, we should recognize the synergy that occurs "when trade secret law encourages the early adoption of new technology . . . and the patent law remains available as an incentive to encourage a full disclosure of that technology . . . ." 84 
VI. Conclusion
The Metallizing rule is in tension with the statutory language and Supreme Court precedent and is, in any event, a highly questionable tool for policing the patent term. Although precedent supports equity as an approach to combating strategic delay of entry into the patent system, it must be acknowledged that the equitable approach, too, has drawbacks. For example, the multifactor test that would be required to determine if the patentee behaved inequitably 85 would likely generate significant costs and uncertainty. So perhaps the rule that would replace Metallizing should, like Metallizing itself, have a bright line. One possible alternative solution, inspired by trademark law, is the presumption of "patent abandonment" if the claimed subject matter had been used as a trade secret for a specific number of years. 86 Another idea, suggested to me by Professor Lemley himself, is to reduce the patent term by the number of years that the underlying invention has been commercially exploited as a trade secret. 87 Professor Lemley is correct that the Metallizing rule addresses an important policy concern, but there must be a better tool out there to do the job. 
